Den av Flygvapeninspektören nyligen skapade "Flygvapenbloggen" börjar få luft under vingarna. Syftet är gott, det inser alla utom möjligen GD Ulf Bengtsson, som den politiskt korrekte han är inte tolerar att någon annan, (läs FVI), lägger sig i den av "creme de la creme" militära elitens fastställda verklighetsbild.
Flygvapenbloggen har nu börjat få intressanta inlägg och kommentarer, det vittnar de senaste dagarnas debatt om flygsäkerhet. Från att från början Flygvapenbloggens inlägg mest liknat vykortstext från semestern har den nu börjat få en djupare och mer intressant innehåll. viljan att kommentera har inledningsvis varit dåligt då misstänksamheten mot vad bloggens syfte egentligen var nu släppt. De kommentarer som skrivs är i stort trovärdiga men förefaller mest skrivna av en mera åldersmogen kategori. Intet ont i det, tvärtom, men det skulle vara tacksamt om även de ynge blandar sig i.
Att Flygvapnet nu har en blogg där kommenterarer välkomnas betyder att dess ledning nu insett att chefer måste tala med folk, inte bara till!
söndag 15 maj 2011
söndag 8 maj 2011
Rör inte min flygvapenchef
De uppgifter som framkommit rörande borttagandet av FVI inlägg på Flygvapenbloggen angående inställandet av årets flygvapenövning är besvärande.
Att FM inte har förmåga att verka i mer än en riktning i taget är väl känt. Att FVI öppet meddelar att vår ekonomi inte tål belastningar i form av uppkomna internationella insatser, och det i en blogg, är bra då det visar på den bräcklighet vi idag har i FM.
FVI visar, en för det högre ledarskapet, en mycket positiv öppenhet vilket ger trovärdighet och förtroende.
Att Då GD i FM ger en annan bild och egentligen tillrättavisar FVI anser jag vara kontraproduktivt både avseende rekrytering till FM och trovärdighet i övrigt.
Att en politisk tillsatt tjänsteman, GD, lägger sig i vad FVI vill förmedla är ingenting annat än en form av ministerstyre.
Rör inte vår FVI, han gör ett bra jobb och är ledande i att skapa nya kommunikationsvägar. Även om han får utstå kritik då och då, bland annat från mig.
Att FM inte har förmåga att verka i mer än en riktning i taget är väl känt. Att FVI öppet meddelar att vår ekonomi inte tål belastningar i form av uppkomna internationella insatser, och det i en blogg, är bra då det visar på den bräcklighet vi idag har i FM.
FVI visar, en för det högre ledarskapet, en mycket positiv öppenhet vilket ger trovärdighet och förtroende.
Att Då GD i FM ger en annan bild och egentligen tillrättavisar FVI anser jag vara kontraproduktivt både avseende rekrytering till FM och trovärdighet i övrigt.
Att en politisk tillsatt tjänsteman, GD, lägger sig i vad FVI vill förmedla är ingenting annat än en form av ministerstyre.
Rör inte vår FVI, han gör ett bra jobb och är ledande i att skapa nya kommunikationsvägar. Även om han får utstå kritik då och då, bland annat från mig.
söndag 1 maj 2011
Preliminär utredning om Spitfirehaveri nu släppt.
Haverikommissionen i Norge har i dagarna släppt en preliminärrapport rörande landningshaveriet i Norge med en av Biltemas Spitfires där piloten omkom. Fortfarande finns ingen säker orsak fastställd utan det är egentligen ett antal hypoteser utredningen diskuterar.
Utredningen fortsätter men det är tveksamt om det kan komma fram ytterligare information.
Här nedan följer utdrag ur den preliminära rapporten.
History of the flight
Tynset flyklubb (aero club) had planned to arrange an airshow at Tynset airfield on Sunday 22
August. The Spitfire was hired to take part in the flying display. The 68 year old pilot was regarded
as one of the most experienced airshow pilots in Sweden. He was widely experienced on a number
of different aircraft types, and had accumulated a total of 31,589 flying hours. His experience on
Spitfire was 165 flying hours. A member of the aero club was dedicated as a liaison between the
club and the pilot. He had telephone contact with the pilot a number of times, the last time during a
refueling stop at Hedlanda Airport (ESCN) in Sweden. During these conversations the pilot was
told that the dry grass runway was 900 m long and 30 m wide with an additional approximately 100
m overrun at each end. The runway orientation was 05/23. The pilot also received information that
the runway had new turf on the area west of the centerline and although it was fully usable it might
be slightly softer than the eastern part of the runway.
The pilot took off from Ängelholm Airport (ESTA) at about 1020 hrs. and flew to Hultsfred Airport
(ESSF). After a short ground stop he departed from Hultsfred Airport and made a flyby over
Stockholm before landing at Västerås Airport (ESOW) at 1240 hrs. He then had a three hour ground
stop before departing for Hedlanda. The flight from Hedlanda to Tynset lasted about 25 minutes. It
was the pilot’s first landing at Tynset. He reported 5.5 NM east of the field shortly before 1830 hrs.
There was no air traffic control at the airfield and a club member flying locally was the only person
who communicated with the Spitfire pilot. The Spitfire was observed by a considerable crowd as it
came in approximately 1,500 – 2,000 ft over the field and made a wide right turn. After crossing the
extended centerline east of the field on a south-easterly heading, it made a wide left turn which
brought it on a left hand base and later final for runway 23. The landing gear and flaps were
lowered in the turn to final and the Spitfire flew a slightly curved, stable descending final leg. The
Spitfire crossed the threshold high and continued about 100 m before the throttle was closed and the
airplane was seen to begin the flare. The airplane was about 5 m above the ground, 230 m from
threshold and continued to float in ground effect. Recordings from a video camera located 350 m
from the threshold showed that the aircraft passed 1 m above the ground at a speed of 83 kt. The
Spitfire touched down on the runway on the main wheels 350 m from threshold, still with the tail
wheel about 0.7 m off the ground.
The airplane touched down with the left main wheel 7 m from the left runway edge. It then became
airborne shortly before the tail wheel made firm imprints on the ground 380 m from the threshold.
The Spitfire moved along a straight line towards the left runway edge and the left main wheel
crossed the runway edge 590 m from the threshold. It gradually drifted left into the adjacent barley
field and flipped over onto its back after traveling 95 m through one meter tall crop. Tracks from
the main wheels show signs of braking action, especially outside the runway. Photos and video
recordings show that the rudder was in neutral position during the entire rollout. Photos of the wind
sock indicate that the wind was 5 kt from 255°.
Findings
The rudder, vertical fin and cockpit canopy became crushed during the flip over. The pilot received
fatal injuries when the cockpit hit the ground and he was declared dead when rescue personnel got
access to the cockpit shortly after the accident. An autopsy revealed no evidence that physiological
factors or incapacitation affected the performance of the pilot. A technical examination of the
airplane revealed no evidence of defects or malfunctions on the flight controls, landing gear or
brake system that can explain the accident.
The threshold marking consisted of three red cones on each side, which might be difficult to
observe from the air. Further, the left (old) part of the runway clearly stood out as a runway
compared to the much fresher green part to the right. The actual touch down point might indicate
that the pilot decided to land along the centerline of the old turf section, and thus had to stay within
the edges of a 16.5 m wide runway. These two factors, compared with the limited forward view
from the Spitfire cockpit, might to some extent explain the accident. However, the AIBN has not
yet found a conclusive explanation as to why the pilot landed far inn from the threshold and failed
to keep directional control.
The investigation is ongoing. AIBN will publish a full report when the investigation has been completed.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Updated preliminary
information or safety recommendations will be issued at any stage of the investigation if deemed
necessary for air safety
Utredningen fortsätter men det är tveksamt om det kan komma fram ytterligare information.
Här nedan följer utdrag ur den preliminära rapporten.
History of the flight
Tynset flyklubb (aero club) had planned to arrange an airshow at Tynset airfield on Sunday 22
August. The Spitfire was hired to take part in the flying display. The 68 year old pilot was regarded
as one of the most experienced airshow pilots in Sweden. He was widely experienced on a number
of different aircraft types, and had accumulated a total of 31,589 flying hours. His experience on
Spitfire was 165 flying hours. A member of the aero club was dedicated as a liaison between the
club and the pilot. He had telephone contact with the pilot a number of times, the last time during a
refueling stop at Hedlanda Airport (ESCN) in Sweden. During these conversations the pilot was
told that the dry grass runway was 900 m long and 30 m wide with an additional approximately 100
m overrun at each end. The runway orientation was 05/23. The pilot also received information that
the runway had new turf on the area west of the centerline and although it was fully usable it might
be slightly softer than the eastern part of the runway.
The pilot took off from Ängelholm Airport (ESTA) at about 1020 hrs. and flew to Hultsfred Airport
(ESSF). After a short ground stop he departed from Hultsfred Airport and made a flyby over
Stockholm before landing at Västerås Airport (ESOW) at 1240 hrs. He then had a three hour ground
stop before departing for Hedlanda. The flight from Hedlanda to Tynset lasted about 25 minutes. It
was the pilot’s first landing at Tynset. He reported 5.5 NM east of the field shortly before 1830 hrs.
There was no air traffic control at the airfield and a club member flying locally was the only person
who communicated with the Spitfire pilot. The Spitfire was observed by a considerable crowd as it
came in approximately 1,500 – 2,000 ft over the field and made a wide right turn. After crossing the
extended centerline east of the field on a south-easterly heading, it made a wide left turn which
brought it on a left hand base and later final for runway 23. The landing gear and flaps were
lowered in the turn to final and the Spitfire flew a slightly curved, stable descending final leg. The
Spitfire crossed the threshold high and continued about 100 m before the throttle was closed and the
airplane was seen to begin the flare. The airplane was about 5 m above the ground, 230 m from
threshold and continued to float in ground effect. Recordings from a video camera located 350 m
from the threshold showed that the aircraft passed 1 m above the ground at a speed of 83 kt. The
Spitfire touched down on the runway on the main wheels 350 m from threshold, still with the tail
wheel about 0.7 m off the ground.
The airplane touched down with the left main wheel 7 m from the left runway edge. It then became
airborne shortly before the tail wheel made firm imprints on the ground 380 m from the threshold.
The Spitfire moved along a straight line towards the left runway edge and the left main wheel
crossed the runway edge 590 m from the threshold. It gradually drifted left into the adjacent barley
field and flipped over onto its back after traveling 95 m through one meter tall crop. Tracks from
the main wheels show signs of braking action, especially outside the runway. Photos and video
recordings show that the rudder was in neutral position during the entire rollout. Photos of the wind
sock indicate that the wind was 5 kt from 255°.
Findings
The rudder, vertical fin and cockpit canopy became crushed during the flip over. The pilot received
fatal injuries when the cockpit hit the ground and he was declared dead when rescue personnel got
access to the cockpit shortly after the accident. An autopsy revealed no evidence that physiological
factors or incapacitation affected the performance of the pilot. A technical examination of the
airplane revealed no evidence of defects or malfunctions on the flight controls, landing gear or
brake system that can explain the accident.
The threshold marking consisted of three red cones on each side, which might be difficult to
observe from the air. Further, the left (old) part of the runway clearly stood out as a runway
compared to the much fresher green part to the right. The actual touch down point might indicate
that the pilot decided to land along the centerline of the old turf section, and thus had to stay within
the edges of a 16.5 m wide runway. These two factors, compared with the limited forward view
from the Spitfire cockpit, might to some extent explain the accident. However, the AIBN has not
yet found a conclusive explanation as to why the pilot landed far inn from the threshold and failed
to keep directional control.
The investigation is ongoing. AIBN will publish a full report when the investigation has been completed.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Updated preliminary
information or safety recommendations will be issued at any stage of the investigation if deemed
necessary for air safety
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